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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
All parties to the appeal are shown on the case caption. The
following

parties

were

named

as defendants

below,

but were

dismissed prior to the appeal:
Thatcher Chemical Company, a Utah corporation, represented by
Ford G. Scalley, David M. Carlson, Lori N. Jerman, of Morgan,
Scalley & Reading, Salt Lake City.
Wasatch Chemical Company, a Utah corporation, represented by
Gary B. Ferguson, Russell C. Fericks, and Brad C. Betebenner, of
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City.
Retep Corporation, a Utah corporation, represented by Robert
R. Wallace, of Hanson, Epperson & Smith, and by McCoy A. McMurray.
Alma G. Peterson, President of Retep, purported to appear pro se on
behalf of the corporation at some hearings.
In addition

to the counsel

listed

on the

cover sheet,

plaintiff has been represented in this proceeding by Fred R.
Silvester, of Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson, Salt Lake City.
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JURISDICTION
The appeal

is from

a final

judgment

in a civil case.

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended.

Prior to transfer, jurisdiction was

proper in the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22 3

( )(j)#

as

amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court correctly rule that the statute of

limitations ran on appellant's claims several years before his
complaint was filed?
2.

Did the district court correctly rule that plaintiff did

not present sufficient evidence to raise a jury question regarding
applicability of the "discovery rule" exception to the statute of
limitations?
3.

Was summary

judgment appropriate

in the absence of

sufficient evidence to raise a jury question on whether exposure to
TCE caused appellant's alleged injuries?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW:

The standard of review is the

same for each of the issues presented on appeal. Summary judgment
is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, the moving party is nevertheless entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

The district court's decision is

reviewed by this Court for correctness.
Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992).

1

Warren v. Provo City

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann, S 78-12-1:
Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the
cause of action has accrued, except in
specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute.
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(3):
Within four years.
An action for
provided for by law.

relief

not

otherwise

U.R.Civ.P. 56:
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any
time after the expiration of 2 0 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
*

*

*

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
. . .
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
*

*

*
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required.
Supporting and opposing
affidavits
shall
be made
on
personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith.
The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When
a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should
it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
In 1988, plaintiff and appellant Robert Larson ("Larson")
brought suit against appellees and others

(hereinafter

"PPG"

collectively), alleging a myriad of physical and emotional problems

3

resulting from exposure to the chemical trichloroethylene ("TCE")
from approximately 1964 until approximately 1972.l
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
ruling that Larson's claims were barred by the four-year statute of
limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.

The Court further noted

that Larson had not adduced evidence to establish that his alleged
injuries were caused by TCE.

(R.531).

Statement of Uncontroverted Facts
The following facts were assumed true or uncontroverted in the
court below:
Robert Larson began working for Black & Decker as a tool
repairer in approximately May, 1964.
thereafter,
("Marilyn").

he

married

his

(R.736; R.1249).

present

wife,

Marilyn

Shortly
Larson

(R.802-803; R.1450-1451).

As a tool repairer for Black & Decker, Larson disassembled
various power tools and, on occasion, cleaned those power tools in
a

vapor

degreaser

which

utilized

TCE.

(R.737; R.752-753).

Depending upon the particular day, Larson would lower tools into
and out of the vapor degreaser as many as fifteen or twenty times.
(R.752).

1

Although PPG and Diamond Shamrock manufactured TCE during
this time frame, there was considerable doubt whether any of that
TCE was sold to suppliers from whom Mr. Larson's employer, Black
and Decker, purchased TCE. For purposes of the Motion for summary
judgment granted by the district court, PPG and Diamond Shamrock
assumed that the TCE to which Mr. Larson was allegedly exposed was
manufactured by them.
4

An air purifying respirator and rubber gloves were available
for workers using the vapor degreaser.

The only time Larson ever

used the air purifying respirator was to clean the vapor degreaser.
(R.620-621; R.756; R.983-984; R.1028-1029; R.1145-1146; R.11671168) .

A washroom was immediately adjacent to the room in which

the vapor degreaser was located but Larson rarely, if ever, washed
his hands following his use of the various degreasers and solvents.
(R.755; R.949-950; R.956).
Within a few months of the date he became employed at Black
and Decker, Larson began to notice physical and emotional symptoms.
He first noticed mood changes in the Summer of 1964.
R.1011-1012; R.1465-1467; R.1528).

(R.764;

Larson began to suffer from

bleeding sinuses in 1966 and has continued to suffer from this
symptom since then.

(R.776; R.1003-1004; R.1539-1540).

Headaches

began in late 1964 and have continued to the present time.

(R.765;

R.1536-1537) .
Larson began experiencing irritation from smelling certain
chemicals in 1965 or 1966.

(R.777).

He also began to suffer from

dizziness in the time frame of 1964 through 1969.
1547).

(R.813; R.1546-

Sometime in the 1960s Larson became impatient, and began to

lose energy.

(R.766-767; R.778-779; R.1547-1548).

In approximately 1969, Larson became the manager of Black and
Decker's Salt Lake City
R. 1456-1457) .

facility.

(R.737-378; R.758; R.1037;

At about the same time that Larson became the

manager, he also began to experience additional symptoms such as a
5

decreased

sex

drive,

memory

loss,

difficulty in "prioritizing" tasks.

slower

reaction

time,

and

(R.761; R.770-772; R.1009-

1010; R.1040; R.1545-1546; R. 1560-1561) .
During
emotionally
R.1551).

the

early

1970s, Larson

and physically

became

quite

violent

abusive with his family.

and

(R.1481;

In 1986 Larson was demoted from manager to senior tool

repairer.

(R.614;

R.634;

R.774-775;

depression as a result of this demotion.

R.994).

He

suffered

(R.774; R.1154).

In approximately 1972, Black and Decker ceased using the TCE
vapor degreaser and switched to some other form of degreasing
utilizing a cold solvent.

(R.624; R.742; R.789; R.817; R.946-947;

R.952-957; R.1036-1037; R.1487).

Larson does not know the name of

these new solvents to which he was exposed,

or of any

solvents to which he has been exposed since that time.

other

(R.742;

R.945-948) .
Larson does not trust doctors and sought no medical attention
for any of his symptoms until early 1985.

(R.785-788; R.1004-1006;

R.1012-1013; R.1014-1015; R.1538-1539; R.1540-1543) .

His wife

would occasionally ask the family doctor about Larson's symptoms
when she was bringing children in for various problems.

(R.783-

786; R.1017-1018; R.1537-1538).
Q.
Okay. Do you remember when you first sought medical
attention for your headaches?
A.

I am sure it was in the '60's, with Dr. Young.

6

Q.
Would you have gone to him specifically for yourself
on that occasion and said "I need you to fix my
headaches," or "I've got a problem?"
A.
Probably not. I kind of suffered along with stuff
and went with my wife or kids or something,and like I
said before, kind of asked him, "What about headaches?"
But I don't remember a specific time of myself just going
in and saying, you know, "We got to figure this out," you
know, I didn't ever do that.
(R.1267).
Mrs. Larson testified that her husband refused to go to
doctor unless he considered the issue very serious, and that
didn't consider these matters serious:
Q.

Did he seek medical attention for those headaches?

A.
Our general practitioner, our general family doctor
had, at different times, tried to have him take different
things to, you know, try. Robert is not a person that
wants to ever go to the doctor. I mean he didn't - you
know, he wouldn't go in for a long time, but if he was in
there for something else and I would say, you know, he
has these terribla headaches, is there anything you can
do for him. And so he would give him a prescription. .
* * * * *

Q.
Did you seek - did he seek medical attention [for
his bloody sinuses]?
A.
Probably just through Dr. Young.
He's the only
doctor that Robert ever went to until we went to Dr.
Lockey [in 1985].
Q.

Weren't you concerned about the bloody sinuses?

A.

Oh, yeah and -

Q.

Was he concerned?

A.
Well, I'm sure he was, but you have to know him to
know - well, he will - you know, he has to fall down on
the floor before he'll go to a doctor. I mean, that's
7

how bad he hates to go and so it isn't strange to me that
he doesn't run to the doctor for things. It has to be
really serious before he would ever go.
* * * * *

Q.
Do you know why your husband was so reluctant to go
to doctors?
A.
Well, he gets nauseated when he walks into a
hospital. Some people just do and some people don't. I
don't know. You know, it's just something that he hates
and he doesn't like, you know.
Q.

He didn't have a traumatic experience with a doctor -

A.

Oh, no.

Q.

- when he was young?

A.
In fact, he never went. In fact, I've asked his
mother many times, you know, and she - he just never had
to go to the doctor for any reason.
(R.1537-1538; R.1540; R.1542-1543).
The statement in Larson's brief that ff[t]he Larsons consulted
the family doctor concerning the headaches and the bloody sinuses"
is not supported by the record citation:
A.
. . . And then I have gone and seen Dr. Young
through the years, and on one of my visits there I am
sure I have asked him about it, you know, about the
headaches. And I am sure asked him about that.
But we never ever said anything to him about
trichloroethylene or anything. It would have been more
just, you know, "What do you think causes it and — where
Q.
Anything that you saw Dr. Young — he's your family
doctor, isn't he?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you tell him what you did for a living?
8

A.

I don't think so.

Q.
Did he take a history from you; that is, ask you
what you did and how old you were and what problems you
had had in the past?
A.
I don't think so. I think more a lot of the visits
with him was going in for my wife or one of the kids, and
lots of times, in passing, we would ask, "What about
this? What about that?"
But many of the times we were there it was just —
maybe I didn't go over there for myself.
Q.
Okay. If you discussed your own condition with Dr.
Young, it was more incidental?
A.

Correct.

(R.1006).
The Larsons assert that several years before filing the
complaint in this action, they saw a television program concerning
potential harmful effects of TCE.

They are unable to recall the

date of the alleged television program, the name of the program,
the network on which the program aired or the identities of any of
the personalities involved.

(R.788-790; R.993-998; R.1457-1461).

The Larsons alleged that as a result of seeing this unidentified
television program concerning TCE and its potential effects on the
human body, they concluded that Larson's physical and emotional
symptomatology was likely due to his exposure to TCE in the mid-tolate 1960s and early 1970s.

(R.788-790; R.800; R.993; R.995;

R.1461; R.1484; R.1571; R.1574-1573).
After viewing the television program, Mrs. Larson began making
inquiries of various health care providers on behalf of her
9

husband.

(R.784-788; R.1528-1529) .

In early 1985, Larson began

receiving medical evaluations to determine whether his symptoms
were the result of TCE exposure. (R.994; R.1538-1539).
None of Larson's health care providers are able to state
definitely that any of Larson's symptoms are the result of Larson's
exposure to TCE.

(R. 531).

Larson's current manager, Bruce Kjar, considers Larson to be
an excellent repairer and to have an absolutely phenomenal memory.
(R.630; R.641-642; R.665-666).

He has observed no significant

personality changes in Larson at work.

(R.651; R.644) Any changes

in mood or personality which he has observed date from the time
Larson was demoted from manager.

(R.679-680).

Larson's complaint with jury demand was filed on August 29,
1988, more than 20 years after Larson's initial exposure and first
recognition of symptoms.

(R.2).

By the time Larson filed his complaint, so much time had
passed from the date of his initial exposure to TCE that neither
his employer nor the defendants had records which would assist any
of the parties in discovery.

(R.536). Witnesses have disappeared

and memories have faded over the past 20 years.

Larson has been

exposed to a number of other solvents and chemicals over the years,
which would make it virtually impossible to determine whether his
alleged symptoms are, or even could have been, caused by his
exposure to TCE.

(R.946-943; R.957; R.966-967).
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Access to critical evidence has also been lost over the past
twenty years•

The vapor degreaser which Larson used is no longer

available for inspection.

It would be impossible, or nearly so, to

determine whether Black & Decker used the vapor degreaser appropriately, whether

it followed the manufacturer's recommendations,

whether it followed the TCE manufacturer's recommendations, and
whether the employees of Black & Decker were obedient to Black &
Decker's policies concerning the use of TCE and vapor degreasers.
(R.536).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because Larson's
complaint was filed several years after the statute of limitations
had

run.

Larson

diligence

to

establish

special

did

avoid

not make

the

application

of

circumstances

threshold
the

showing

statute,

warranting

and

of

due

did

not

of

the

application

"discovery rule" exception. Summary judgment was also appropriate
because Larson offered no medical testimony to establish that his
alleged

medical

condition

was

caused

by

exposure

to

TCE,

a

requisite element beyond the knowledge of ordinary jurors.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON LARSON'S
CLAIMS RAN MORE THAN TEN YEARS BEFORE
LARSON FILED SUIT.

Larson's Complaint set forth claims sounding in negligence,
breach of warranty and strict liability in tort.
tion of the motion for summary
11

Pending resolu-

judgment, Larson abandoned

his

breach of warranty claim, focusing solely on the negligence and
product liability claims.
Utah law provides that "an action for relief not otherwise
provided for by law" must be brought within four years "after the
cause of action has accrued."
25(3).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-1, 78-12-

Section 78-12-25, and its similarly worded predecessors,

have long been held to apply to claims sounding in negligence.
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 579 n. 1 (Utah App. 1990);
Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d

244, 246

(1933).

Additionally, because there was no other statute of limitations
applicable to product liability claims, Section 78-12-25(3) would
also apply to those claims.2
It is well established in Utah that a cause of action accrues,
and the statute of limitations begins to run, "upon the happening
of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action . . . "
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d
quoting

1125, 1129

(Utah 1992),

Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).

"A tort

cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and
the claim is actionable."

Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844

P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992).

2

At the time Larson filed his complaint, the former
version of the product liability statute had been declared
unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court.
Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). The current statute, which
requires suit to be filed within two years from the date a
plaintiff knows or should know of the defect, had not yet been
enacted. (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et seq.)
12

"In traditional negligence cases, a cause of action accrues
when all the elements necessary to maintenance of a lawsuit are
present; the time of occurrence of the last of those elements is
made the critical point of initial inquiry-11

Pavne bv and through

Pavne v, Mvers, 743 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1987).

The "last of those

elements" in a negligence case is harm or injury.

Id.

at 189-90;

Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985) (elements of
negligence claim are duty, breach, causation, and damages).

All

the elements of a product liability claim are present if a person
who is engaged in the business sells a defective and unreasonably
dangerous product which is expected to, and does, reach the
consumer without substantial change, and the product causes harm.
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co. . 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah
1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
Thus, in both negligence and product liability causes of
action, the last event necessary to render a situation actionable
is injury.

At the very latest, therefore, Larson's complaint

should have been filed no more than four years from the date his
last symptom manifested itself. The parties agree that all of the
symptoms from which Larson now suffers had manifested themselves by
the time he was appointed to manage the Salt Lake office of Black
& Decker, some time during the early 1970s. (R.558). Accordingly,
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Larson's lawsuit was filed approximately 10 or 15 years too late
under even the most liberal interpretation of his circumstances.3
Larson

seeks to avoid application

of the general rule,

however, by arguing that the statute of limitations in a product
liability case does not begin to run until the plaintiff "become[s]
aware of the causal relationship between the injury and the
prospective defendant."

(Brief of Appellant, p.10).

Larson then

asserts that a jury question exists as to when he first gained that
knowledge.
In support of this argument, Larson cites Foil v. Ballincrer,
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) and Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471
(Utah

App.

1988),

both

of

which

addressed

the

statute

of

limitations governing medical malpractice claims, Utah Code Ann. §
78-14-4.

Under that section, the statute of limitations in a

medical malpractice case is "two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury . . . "
In Foil, the Utah Supreme Court held that the word "injury" in
Section 78-14-4 means "legal injury."

In other words, the statute

of limitations on a medical malpractice claim does not begin to run

3

In actuality, Larson's cause of action accrued several
years earlier, when he first began experiencing major symptoms in
the late 1960s. Under the majority rule, once a substantial injury
is manifested, the statute of limitations begins to run, even as to
later discovered injuries. See, e.g., Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson
& Co. , Inc. , 749 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1984); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 899 Comments c & e, § 910.
14

until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably could have learned, of the
injury and its possible negligent cause.

Id.

As this Court noted in Deschamps, the Supreme Court's holding
in Foil was based upon "concerns with the filing of unfounded
claims and the temptation for health care providers to fail to
advise patients of mistakes until after the limitations period has
Deschamps, supra,

run . . . "

784 P. 2d at 473.

This Court has

cited similar concerns in extending the modified accrual rule to
legal malpractice cases.

In Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P. 2d 16, 19

(Utah App. 1989), the Court wrote, "[w]e think that fundamental
fairness also requires the imposition of the discovery rule because
the attorney-client relationship is based upon trust, and is a
situation in which one less knowledgeable must rely on another, who
has special expertise, for advice and assistance."

The Court

quoted favorably from a decision issued by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court: "The attorney, like the doctor, is an expert, and
much of his work is done out of the client's view.

The client is

not an expert; he cannot be expected to recognize professional
negligence if he sees it, and he should not be expected to watch
over the professional or to retain a second professional to do so."
Id.,

quoting Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131,

135 (1974) .
Foil

and

Merkley

thus

recognize

a

unique

presented in professional malpractice cases:

circumstance

it is often the

potential defendant upon whom plaintiff will rely for information
15

about his or her status.

See, Stewart v. K&S Co., Inc., 591 P.2d

433, 435 (Utah 1979) (M[w]here there is a fiduciary relationship,
such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the statute
of

limitations does not begin to run until the

stockholder

discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should discover,
that there is a wrong to be complained of . . . " ) .
In product
plaintiff

liability cases involving personal

ordinarily

will,

and

should,

receive

injury, a
information

necessary to know whether there is a cause of action from a neutral
third party, namely a health care provider.

There is no inherent

conflict, and no affront to "fundamental fairness."
Absent those considerations, the long-standing rule regarding
accrual

of tort actions applies to Larson's

claims.

Under

precedent of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, Larson's
negligence and product liability causes of action arose, and the
four-year statute of limitations began to run, in the early 1970s.
Larson urges the Court, however, to apply a different standard
espoused by courts in other jurisdictions.

In particular, Larson

points to Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980)
(applying Oklahoma law) and Pereira v. Dow Chemical Company, Inc.,
129 Cal.App.3d 865, 181 Cal.Rptr. 364 (Cal.App. 1982).
Larson's reliance on those cases is misplaced.

The Utah

Supreme Court has consistently explained the role and requirements
of the discovery rule under Utah law.

While Williams and Pereira

cast the discovery rule in terms of when the cause of action
16

accrues, Utah recognizes the role of the discovery rule as an
exception

to,

not

limitation periods.

an

extension

of,

statutorily

prescribed

Except in cases involving relationships of

trust, notably those involving professional malpractice, Utah
applies the traditional rule of accrual to determine when a statute
of

limitations

has

protection, however.

run.

Plaintiffs

are

not

left

without

If exceptional circumstances exist by which

a plaintiff should be relieved of the uniform effects of a statute
of limitations, plaintiffs may seek application of the discovery
rule.
The primary distinction between Utah's established system and
that employed in Oklahoma or elsewhere is that Utah recognizes and
preserves

to

limitations.

a

greater

extent

the

purpose

of

statutes

of

A limitation period reflects a reasonable amount of

time during which defendants should be on notice and at risk.

If

a plaintiff seeks to bring an action beyond that prescribed time,
it is logical and fair to expect the plaintiff to demonstrate why
he or she should be allowed.

As discussed below in Points II and

III, the Utah Supreme Court has outlined the procedure and burden
a plaintiff must meet to invoke the discovery rule.

Plaintiffs

should not be permitted to circumvent those mandates by labeling
their request as one for modification of normal accrual principles.
Even if Larson's application of medical malpractice accrual
principles were appropriate to his product liability and negligence
claims, those claims would not be saved in any event.
17

Larson

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding when he
knew, or should have known, of the possible cause of his injuries.4
The district court determined from the Larsons' own testimony that
a reasonable

jury

could

reasonable diligence.

not conclude

Larson had

acted with

That conclusion is dispositive of Larson's

accrual argument, regardless of how characterized.3
II.

LARSON FAILED TO HAKE A THRESHOLD SHOWING
OF DUE DILIGENCE TO AVOID APPLICATION OF
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Larson seeks to avoid the effect of the statutes of limitations
by arguing that the "discovery rule" should be applied to excuse
his untimely filing.

The district court agreed with Larson that

"in some instances the statute does not begin to run until
discovery of the cause of the injury is made by the claimant."
However, the

district

court

concluded

that,

based

upon

the

undisputed facts and evidence adduced, no reasonable jury could
4

Deschamps clarified that the medical malpractice statute
is triggered by notice of a possible,
not probable,
cause.
5

In the court below, Larson attempted to cure his statute
of limitations problems by claiming that he did not understand that
TCE could cause his symptoms until watching an unidentified
television program in 1984. Larson alleged that his lawsuit was
filed within four years from the date of that television program.
However, as the district court noted, "[Larson] has been unable to
ascertain the date he and his wife saw the television program in
which the effects of TCE were discussed."
(R.531). PPG after
extensive investigation, was unable to locate any reference to the
alleged broadcast.
(R.587-592). Larson's failure to recall or
offer evidence of any details regarding the claimed 1984 television
program, such as the date upon which it aired, the network, or any
other identifying information, made it impossible to test the
validity of his claim, and was insufficient to take this claim of
late discovery outside the realm of speculation.
18

find that Larsons complaint was filed within four years of when
plaintiff knew or should have known of his potential cause of
action.

(R.535-36).

On appeal, Larson argues that a jury could find that he
reasonably believed his symptoms were caused by personal factors,
such as a recent marriage and beginning a new job, rather than some
external source.

In light of the severe physical symptoms which

plaintiff admittedly began noticing as early as the mid-1960s
including bleeding sinuses, dizziness, and memory loss —

—

and the

undisputed fact that the symptoms only manifested themselves after
plaintiff's initial exposure to TCE, the district court was correct
in concluding that the highly improbable scenario presented by
plaintiff was insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the jury.
Larson's arguments to the contrary fail to recognize that it
is Larson's

burden to establish due diligence.

The Utah Supreme

Court has noted that, before a court need make any determination
regarding applicability of a discovery rule, a plaintiff must make
a showing —

"as a threshold matter" — that he or she did not know

the facts giving rise to the cause of action, and could not learn
them through the exercise of due diligence. O'Neal v. Division of
Family Services, State of Utah. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144; Warren v.
Provo City Corp. , 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) ("an initial
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know of and could
not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action
in time to file a claim within the limitation period.")
19

Absent evidence necessary to satisfy his initial burden of
demonstrating reasonable diligence, Larson may not invoke the
"discovery" exception to avoid the statute of limitations.

As in

Warren, the plaintiff here "has not alleged any facts demonstrating
that he undertook reasonable steps to investigate [the defendant's]
liability.

Therefore, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not

shown that he could not have reasonably known about the cause of
action in time to file his claim within the statutory period."

Id.

at 1129.
Application

of

these

well-established

principles

is

dispositive of Larson's challenge to the district court's ruling.
As the district court noted, "[t]his was not a case wherein the
disease or ailment laid dormant or was latent before manifesting
its symptoms; therefore, plaintiff would have no reason for not
pursuing medical attention or filing a suit at an earlier time."
The court reached its determination in light of the uncontroverted
fact that all of Larson's symptoms manifested themselves shortly
after the exposure to TCE, but by his own admission Larson did not
pursue medical attention or make any real attempt to learn what was
causing his physical and emotional problems for some twenty years.
Larson misses the point distinguishing cases by emphasizing
his own claimed ignorance of a causal link.

The actual point is

that Larson did nothing to find out what was causing his alleged
symptoms, unlike the plaintiffs in Williams, Pereira, Mann v. A.H.
Robins Co., 741 P.2d

79

(5th Cir. 1984),
20

and Hando v. PPG

Industries, 771 P.2d

956

(Mont. 1989), all cited by Larson.

Larson's alleged fear of doctors cannot excuse his duty to exercise
due diligence.

Cf.

O'Neal, supra

(psychological inability to

disclose abuse insufficient to toll statute).
Larson argues, however, that the district court impermissibly
made findings of fact based upon the evidence presented to it.
While Larson does not point to a particular finding of fact by the
court, he argues that "taking oral testimony is inconsistent with
the rule that the Court on summary judgment may not weigh the
evidence, determine credibility issues, nor make findings." (Brief
of Appellant at 22) . The difficulty with Larson's argument is that
it fails to recognize the purpose of the hearing held by the
district court.
district

The transcript of the hearing (R.556) and the

court's Memorandum

Decision

(R.52 0) refute

characterization of the district court's actions.

Larson's

The court

provided Larson with a generous opportunity to present live (and
thus presumably more extensive) evidence on the primary issue
raised in the motion for summary judgment: whether Larson could
present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material
fact to avoid application of the statute of limitations.
Nowhere in the hearing transcript, Memorandum Decision, or
Order and Judgment is there any suggestion that the district court
"resolv[ed] factual matters against plaintiff," as Larson claims.
The court could have read the deposition testimony of Larson and
his wife and reached the same conclusion.
21

The court simply

determined that the evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact.

Sufficiency of the evidence to submit an

issue to the jury is a question of law, not of fact.

Mitchell v.

Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
III. LARSON FAILED TO ESTABLISH EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING APPLICATION OF
THE DISCOVERY RULE IN ANY EVENT.
Even if Larson had met the threshold showing of due diligence,
Larson would then have to establish that exceptional circumstances
warranted invocation of the discovery rule. The Utah Supreme Court
has observed that courts may find the discovery rule applicable
under three circumstances.

O'Neal, supra,

Kicrhtly. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990).

at 1143; Klinger v

The first two, where the

discovery rule is mandated by statute or a defendant has taken
steps to conceal the cause of action, are not argued by Larson.
Under the third circumstance, "without regard to any showing
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of
action, the discovery rule may be applied where the case presents
x

exceptional

circumstances

or

causes

of

action

where

the

application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust."1
O'Neal, supra,

821 P.2d at 1143, quoting

Myers, supra,

635 P.2d at

86. The party seeking to avoid the statute of limitations bears the
burden of proving the existence of such exceptional circumstances.
O'Neal, supra,

821 P.2d at 1144.

Larson failed to offer any evidence or argument demonstrating
the

existence

of

exceptional

circumstances.
22

In

fact,

the

circumstances of the case militate against such a finding. If ever
there was

a

case warranting

limitations, this is it.

application

of

the

statute of

Such statutes "are designed to promote

justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
P.2d at 86, quoting

Myers. supra,

635

Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway

Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88
L.Ed.2d 788 (1944).
Larson allowed 24 years to pass from the date of his exposure
to TCE before filing suit.

Many of the symptoms of which he

complains were known to him as early as 1964; all of them were
known to him by 1972. His only stated excuse for not exploring the
cause of the symptoms was distrust of doctors.

Both the law and

the facts of this case demonstrate the correctness of the district
court's conclusion that Larson's claims were barred by the statute
of limitations.
IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ALSO APPROPRIATE
BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF
HAD
NOT
ADDUCED
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION.

In his memorandum decision, the district court also noted that
Larson had no evidence that his alleged injuries were caused by
exposure to TCE.

As the district court noted, "the health care

providers have not been able to definitely state that any of the
plaintiff's symptoms are the result of his exposure to TCE.11
(R.531) .
23

Dismissal of Larson's action for insufficient evidence of
causation was warranted under the precedent of this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court.

The alleged long-term effects of a chemical

compound such as TCE, and the actual cause of Larson's various
medical complaints, are subjects not within the ordinary knowledge
of a layperson. Absent expert medical testimony, no genuine issue
of

material

fact

existed

on

this

issue.

Reeves

v. Geicrv

Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988) (expert
medical testimony required to establish that skin injuries were
caused by prescription drugs); cf. King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 864-65 (Utah 1992).
The need for expert testimony is particularly great in this
type of case, where a determination of causation would require
elimination of other likely causes, such as exposure to various
other

chemicals

causative

over

elements

the

intervening

might

differ

years.

for

Moreover, the

particular

individual

conditions, which would be difficult for a lay jury to distinguish
without assistance from a medical expert.
Larson's own physicians would not state that Larson's symptoms
were probably caused by TCE, and Larson did not offer any other
medical evidence.

"Where the proximate cause of an injury is left

to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law."
supra,

697 P.2d at 24 6, quoting

Mitchell,

Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of

Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982).

In this case, a

determination

were

that

Larson's

alleged
24

injuries

caused

by

exposure to TCE would have been nothing but speculation.

Larson's

complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to adduce sufficient
evidence of causation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellees respectfully
request that the district court's judgment and order be affirmed.
DATED this y^

day of July, 1993.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

l\AM4k
Jay E. Jejnsen
Phillip S. Ferguson
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellees
PPG Industries, Inc., and
Diamond Shamrock Company
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIC^Mr-DTSTRT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROBERT C. LARSON,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

C-88-5604

vs.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Pennsylvania Corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

An evidentiary hearing was held on June 3, 1991 pursuant to
Motions filed by the defendants Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co.
and PPG Industries.
Smith.

Defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were represented by

Jay E. Jensen.
Alma

G.

Plaintiff was represented by Stanley R.

Defendant Retep Corporation was represented by

Peterson.

The

causes

of

action

against

Thatcher

Chemical Co. and Wasatch Chemical Co. were heretofore dismissed
with prejudice.
The

Court

heard

the

testimony

of

witnesses,

Memoranda filed and took the matter under advisement.
unknown

read

the

For some

reason the file was returned to the clerk's office

without the Motion for Summary Judgment being ruled upon and
counsel advised accordingly.

The Court now enters its ruling.

(\ftC\~S'^

LARSON V, PPG INDUSTRIES

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The plaintiff claims that during the years 1964 through
1974 he was exposed to the chemical trichloroethylene ("TCE")
while being in the employment of Black and Decker as a tool
repairman,
TCE was used to clean power tools.
TCE, had

available

purifying

Employees, when using

for their protection

respirators

and

ready

rubber

access

gloves, air

to

a

washroom.

Plaintiff did not use the respirator at all times or wash his
hands regularly when working with the TCE.
Within

a

few months

after being

employed

by

Black and

Decker, plaintiff began to experience physical and emotional
symptoms,

such

dizziness,

as

mood

headaches,

changes,

bleeding

irritability,

from
lack

the
of

sinuses,

sex

drive,

memory loss, and he became abusive with his wife and family.
Even

though

one

or

more

of

these

symptoms

manifested

themselves, plaintiff did not seek medical attention.
Plaintiff contends that while watching a television program
in 1984 he was alerted to the potential harmful effects of
TCE.

However, it was not until some four years later that he

filed this action.
The

issue

plaintiff's

presented

cause

of

to

action

the

Court

is

whether

is

barred

by

the

or

statute

not
of

limitations.
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until plaintiff saw the television program in
1984, about TCE which made him aware of his claim for injuries.
The Court agrees that in some instances the statute does
not begin to run until discovery of the cause of the injury is
made by the claimant.
The credible evidence leads the Court to find that the
symptoms manifested themselves shortly after the exposure to
TCE, but plaintiff did not pursue medical attention or attempt
to learn what was causing his physical and emotional problems.
This was not a case wherein the disease or ailment laid
dormant

or

was

latent

before

manifesting

therefore, plaintiff would have no reason

its

symptoms;

for not pursuing

medical attention or filing a suit at an earlier time.
Plaintiff has been unable to ascertain the date he and his
wife saw the television program in which the effects of TCE
were discussed.

In addition, the health care providers have

not been able to definitely state that any of the plaintiff's
symptoms are the result of his exposure to TCE.
The

Court

concludes

that

these

defendants'

Motion

Summary Judgment should be granted.
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for

LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES

The

Court

refers

PAGE FOUR

the

parties

MEMORANDUM DECISION

to

these

defendants7

Memorandum and Reply Memorandum for additional reasons why the
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Dated this

°

day of December, 1991.

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

this

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

to

the

following,

(?~ day of December, 1991:

Stanley R. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 N. Center Street
P.O. Box 310
American Fork, Utah 84003-0310
Jay E. Jensen
Attorney for PPG and Diamond Shamrock
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Alma G. Peterson
Attorney for Defendant Retep Corp.
27 3 5 Thunderbird Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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Attorneys for PPG and Diamond Shamrock
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. LARSON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
v.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation;
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS
COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; THATCHER CHEMICAL
COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
WASATCH CHEMICAL COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; and RETEP
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C88-05604
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants PPG
Industries, Inc., and Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, on or
about May 25, 1990, came on for hearing before the Honorable John
A. Rokich on July 30, 1990.

The plaintiff was represented by

Stanley R. Smith and defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were
represented by Phillip S. Ferguson. Retep was present through its
President, Alma G. Peterson, although it was not represented by
counsel. Retep joined in the Motion in open Court. The Motion was
held in abeyance for 90 days pending further discovery by the
plaintiff.

It came on for hearing a second time on January 7,

00053d

1991.

Before ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court

elected to conduct an evidentiary hearing which occurred on June 3,
1991. Retep was neither present nor represented at the evidentiary
hearing.

The Court, having studied the memoranda filed by the

parties, having considered the testimony offered by plaintiff and
defendants on the issue of the statute of limitations, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Order and Judgment:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The statute of limitations applicable to this case is

§ 78-12-25(3), the general four year statute of limitations.
2.

The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run when

the last event giving rise to the cause of action occurs which, in
this case, was no later than December 31, 1974.
3.

The recognized exceptions to the general rule regarding

the commencement of the statue of limitations, collectively known
as the discovery rule, do not apply in this case because (a) there
is no provision for the cipplication of the discovery rule within
the statute itself; (b) it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware
of all of the symptoms of which he now complains by 1974, most of
them within months of his first exposure to TCE in 1964 and 1965;
(c) although plaintiff sought occasional medical attention for his
various symptoms, it is undisputed that plaintiff made no effort to
learn the cause of his symptoms until several weeks after viewing
an unidentified television program in 1984; (d) there is no
evidence that defendants concealed or misled or attempted to
2
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conceal or mislead or otherwise prevent plaintiff from learning any
information about triclorolethylene and the potential side effects,
if any, caused by exposure to triclorolethylene in the work place
environment; (e) there are no exceptional circumstances which
prevented plaintiff from seeking treatment and filing suit many
years earlier than he did.
4.

To the extent the discovery rule may be applicable to

this case, plaintiff's delay of fourteen to twenty-four years
before making any effort to learn the cause of his symptoms was not
justified, and reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to
whether plaintiff should have made an attempt to determine whether
his symptoms were caused by exposure to triclorolethylene prior to
viewing the unidentified television program sometime in 1984.
5.

Plaintiff's long delay in attempting to connect his

symptoms with his exposure to triclorolethylene has made it
virtually impossible for the parties to discover credible evidence
regarding

who

supplied

the

triclorolethylene

to

plaintiff's

employer, whether all applicable instructions and warnings were
transmitted by the distributors to the employer, whether the
plaintiff was exposed to other chemicals, toxic substances, or
circumstances which could account for his symptoms, and whether the
symptoms from which plaintiff suffers were caused by exposure to
triclorolethylene, all of which constitutes serious prejudice to
the defendants should plaintiff be allowed to pursue his claim.
6.

For all other reasons set forth in the Memorandum in

Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and their Reply
3
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Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Judgment is entered herewith in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action.

Defendants are awarded their

costs incurred herein.
DATED this

/ 7

day of

^znu&r^\

199^

BY THE COURT:

JL- /? \-M
jQhri/A. Rokich
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Stanley R. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff
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